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Research has suggested that during a recognition test, we re-enter the mode of processing 
engaged at encoding to help constrain our memory search during retrieval (Jacoby, Shimizu, 
Daniels, & Rhodes, 2005). A by-product of such a constrained search is that new information 
(such as foils, or distractors) present on that recognition test inadvertently becomes encoded and 
tainted	with this re-activated processing mode, reaping the benefits (or costs) of the re-activated 
processing mode on subsequent memory tests. Other research has shown that memory 
performance is enhanced for information encountered within an emotional relative to a neutral 
context (Erk et al., 2003). This thesis examined whether, in the process of remembering 
information learned within an ‘emotional context’, task-irrelevant information gets encoded with 
that same emotional valence, resulting in enhanced later memorability. We adapted Jacoby’s 
(2005) memory for foils paradigm to determine whether the emotionality of the background 
visual context, upon which a target word was presented during encoding, influenced memory for 
foils on a subsequent recognition test. We also wanted to determine whether there were 
individual differences in the degree to which a negative or neutral visual context could influence 
subsequent memory for foils. Because some individuals, such those with high levels of anxiety, 
adopt an inherently negative mindset, this may particularly enhance memory for words overlayed 
on contexts that are the source of their anxiety (Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Rachman, 2004). 
Given this, we compared performance in individuals classified with high versus low levels of 
trait anxiety in Experiment 1, and high versus low fear of spiders in Experiment 2. We examined 
whether participants would better remember foils from a recognition test of ‘negatively-tinged’ 
targets, compared to ‘neutrally-tinged’ targets. In two experiments, participants studied words 
overlayed on either negative (negative valence IAPS pictures in Experiment 1; spider pictures in 
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Experiment 2) or neutral (neutral valence IAPS pictures in Experiment 1; animal pictures in 
Experiment 2) context pictures. Following study, participants completed a recognition test (Test 
1) split into 2 blocks: one for words originally overlayed on to negative pictures, one for words 
overlayed onto neutral contexts. A final surprise recognition test (Test 2) was then administered 
containing all of the foil words from each of the Test 1 test blocks. In Experiment 1, we found a 
significant three-way interaction on Test 2, whereby individuals with high levels of anxiety, who 
initially studied target words using a ‘shallow/perceptual’ encoding instruction, demonstrated 
significantly higher recognition accuracy for foils derived from the negative, compared to the 
neutral, Test 1 block. In Experiment 2, all participants demonstrated a downstream memory 
advantage for foils derived from the negative compared to the neutral Test 1 block. Findings 
suggest that emotionality of the initial encoding context can create a downstream memory bias. 
Results extend Jacoby’s (2005) source-constrained retrieval hypothesis, and suggest that 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
When trying to retrieve information about our past, we do so by constraining our ‘memory 
search’ to the mode of processing we had engaged during initial encoding (Jacoby, Shimizu, 
Daniels, & Rhodes, 2005a). For example, if we focused on the meaning of words during 
encoding, we think about word meanings again when we later search our memory to determine 
whether a given word was part of a previously studied list. Conversely, if we focused on the 
perceptual characteristics of the word (e.g., font colour) then subsequent memory searches will 
target perceptual aspects. A by-product of such a search is that new information (such as foils, or 
distractors) present on that recognition test inadvertently becomes encoded, and tainted, reaping 
memory benefits (or costs) of the re-activated processing mode on subsequent tests. On a similar 
note, if we were to encounter words within an emotional context, we may think about those 
emotional aspects again when attempting to recognize the words during retrieval. Moreover, 
would this effect be different for those who more regularly display a negative mindset? This 
thesis examined whether, in the process of remembering information learned within an emotional 
context, task-irrelevant information gets encoded with that same emotional valence, resulting in 
enhanced later memorability. 
Recapitulation and the Memory-for-foils Effect 
According to the transfer appropriate processing principle (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 
1977), memory retrieval will be best when the processes invoked during retrieval match those 
undergone during encoding, consistent with these two processes being intimately linked and 
interdependent. In line with this, in the proceduralist perspective proposed by Kolers (1973; 
Kolers & Roediger, 1984, for a recent review, see Roediger, Gallo, & Geraci, 2002), encoding 
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and retrieval are seen as extensively overlapping; as such, it becomes difficult, and ultimately 
meaningless, to identify discrete encoding and retrieval phases. 
One of the most compelling lines of research demonstrating a link between encoding and 
retrieval processes is that using the memory-for-foils paradigm developed by Jacoby and 
colleagues (Jacoby et al., 2005a; see also Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005b; Shimizu 
& Jacoby, 2005). They proposed that when remembering previously encoded information, the 
mode of processing engaged during initial encoding is brought back online. In their research, 
they introduced a ‘memory-for-foils’ paradigm in which participants initially studied separate 
lists of words either under a deep (pleasantness judgment) or shallow (vowel judgment) level of 
processing. Following study, two recognition tests were administered (Test 1), and participants 
were told that each corresponded to either the deeply or the shallowly studied target words, 
intermixed among unique sets of foil (lure) words.  Finally, in a third phase, participants were 
given a surprise recognition test assessing memory for the foil words (Test 2). The critical 
finding from this paradigm was that participants displayed better recognition for foil words that 
were derived from the recognition test of deep target words than of shallow target words.  
To account for this effect, Jacoby and colleagues proposed that during retrieval (on Test 
1) participants re-entered the original encoding mode (i.e., either deep encoding or shallow 
encoding) throughout that recognition test, so as to constrain their memory search.  By re-
engaging the encoding mode, at the time of retrieval, the same processing was applied to all 
words (both the old target words and the foils) on that recognition test. The end result was a 
benefit to memory on the subsequent recognition test (Test 2) for the foils initially contained 
within the ‘deep’ recognition test, as compared to the ‘shallow’ test. The benefit of deep 
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processing had been conferred onto the foil words, thus producing a memory advantage for these 
foils. 
If such a ‘source-constrained retrieval’ is indeed occurring, then the “memory-for-foils” 
effect should be apparent following any number of different encoding manipulations (not just a 
level of processing one), as long as those modes of processing can be reinstated at the time of 
retrieval. There have been a number of corroborating studies since 2005, confirming and 
extending the memory-for-foils paradigm (Alban & Kelley, 2012; Halamish, Goldsmith, & 
Jacoby, 2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2013; Marsh et al., 2009) and providing evidence consistent 
with the reinstatement of encoding processes at the time of retrieval. Importantly, Danckert, 
MacLeod, and Fernandes (2011) showed that another encoding manipulation—other than the 
standard levels-of-processing manipulation—also produced the memory-for-foils pattern. In their 
study, imaging the referents of the words during encoding, as opposed to imaging the words 
transformed from lower to upper case, led to better memory for the foils (on Test 2) that came 
from the deep than shallow recognition test (i.e., from Test 1).  
In related work, initial cognitive processes or neural regions initially active at encoding 
have been shown to become re-engaged when tested at retrieval, in a process known as 
recapitulation (Buckner, Wheeler & Sheridan, 2001; Rugg, Johnson, Park, & Uncapher, 2008). 
In a recent study, Vogelsang, Bonnici, Bergstrom, Ranganath, and Simons (2016) demonstrated 
the process of recapitulation using the memory-for-foils paradigm. Participants completed a 
version of the memory-for-foils paradigm (Jacoby, 2005a, 2005b; Shimizu & Jacoby, 2005), in 
which they were in an fMRI scanner throughout the study. Behavioural results replicated those 
of previous works. Interestingly, fMRI analysis also revealed that the left inferior frontal gyrus (a 
region active during a ‘deep encoding’ instruction at encoding and not during a ‘shallow 
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encoding’ instruction) was active for foils that had been presented within a recognition test for 
deeply-encoded targets. Considering that this area was active during retrieval for deeply encoded 
words, but not for shallowly encoded words, suggests that constraining retrieval for a particular 
processing type does indeed reactivate that particular (deep) mode of processing.   
One goal of this thesis was to extend the source-constrained retrieval paradigm to 
contrast effects from an emotionally negative to neutral context. We aimed to determine whether 
negative visual contexts experienced during an encoding phase for targets could later produce 
enhanced memory for ‘foils’ present during an initial test for that target information. Other 
research has shown that memory performance is enhanced for information encountered within an 
emotionally negative relative to neutral context (Erk et al., 2003). Given this, we reasoned that in 
the process of remembering information learned within a negative context, task-irrelevant 
information (the foils from the recognition test) would also be encoded and tagged with that 
same negative valence; the end result would be enhanced later memorability for these foils 
relative to foils encountered from a recognition test for neutral-context targets.  
Memory Boost for Negative Material and from Negative Contexts 
Numerous studies have demonstrated a memory advantage for emotional content, 
whether that content came in the form of pictures, statements, or words (Bradley, Greenwald, 
Petry, & Lang, 1992; Danion, Kauffmann-Muller, Grange, Zimmermann, & Greth, 1995; Cahill 
& McGaugh, 1996; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a, 2003b; Bishop, Dalgleish, & Yule, 2004). 
However, the main goal of our research is to determine whether emotional processing can 
influence encoding of incidental, otherwise neutral, information. That is, instead of determining 
whether emotional content itself is more memorable, we sought to investigate whether neutral, 
incidental information can become more memorable through an association with emotional 
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content. In a relatively recent study, Senn and Radomsky (2012) examined whether memory for 
neutral stimuli could be influenced by attributing new threatening contexts to otherwise neutral 
stimuli. In their study, participants with spider phobia studied objects placed in two boxes for 
two later memory assessments. Participants then completed a free recall test, providing a 
baseline of participants’ memory performance. Following a break, the experimenter informed 
participants, randomly assigned to a ‘threat’ condition that a spider would often play in one of 
the two boxes. Conversely, participants in a ‘non-threat’ condition were told that the same box 
was used to store paper. Subsequently, a second free recall test for the objects was administered; 
results showed that individuals in the threat condition recalled a higher proportion of objects 
contained within the ‘spider box’, than those in the non-threat condition. Importantly, there was 
no difference between groups in memory for the objects on the first recall test, only a difference 
on the second test, following the ‘threat’ manipulation. Findings from this study suggest that the 
objects were not especially memorable until negative contextual information had been attributed 
to them, and this conferred a memory benefit on those objects. In other words, neutral objects 
became more memorable as a consequence of being associated with additional negative 
information.  
More recently, Bowen and Kensinger (2017) have found evidence suggesting a neural 
explanation for the associated memory advantage. In their study, the researchers investigated the 
influence of emotional valence on recapitulation by pairing neutral words with either negative, 
positive, or neutral faces or scenes. Participants then completed a recognition test (remember-
know-new paradigm) for the words presented alone. Both encoding and retrieval were completed 
in an fMRI scanner. Results revealed greater overlap in neural regions for words that had been 
studied in a negative context, as compared to positive and neutral contexts.  
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The process of recapitulation has been elicited using the memory-for-foils paradigm 
(Vogelsang et al., 2016). In this study, fMRI scans revealed reactivation of deep encoding 
regions at the time of retrieval when attempting to recognize foils intermixed among deeply 
studied targets. If the memory-for-foils paradigm can be used to induce recapitulation for words 
processed using a deep encoding instruction, this paradigm may also be able to induce 
recapitulation for words encoded with an emotional mode of processing. 
Individual Differences in Anxiety and Memory Bias 
Among high trait anxiety groups, it has been suggested that negative, threat-relevant 
stimuli recruit significant attentional resources (Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004; 
Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010) and are often characterized by 
intrusive or pervasive thoughts directed toward the source of anxiety (see Coles & Heimberg, 
2002 for review). Research on mood-congruent memory (Bower, 1981) suggests that 
information is better remembered if one’s current mood matches the valence of the to-be-
remembered information. As such, individuals plagued by an inherently negative mindset, such 
as highly anxious individuals, may have better memory for negative information. Consequently, 
this negative mindset and directed attention toward negative stimuli may influence the perception 
of incidental, otherwise neutral, stimuli in the current environment. 
Past research has suggested that anxious individuals may only exhibit the traditional 
emotional memory boost toward items that they find particularly threatening. In line with this, 
Radomsky and Rachman (1999) showed enhanced memory for items related to the threat of 
contamination in an obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) population. In another study, Ceschi, 
Van der Linden, Dunker, Perroud, and Brédart (2003) used a similar procedure, and showed a 
significant memory enhancement for contaminated objects. Radomsky, Rachman, and Hammond 
7 
 
(2001) also examined whether compuslvie checkers would exhibit a memory enhancement for 
threat-relevant information, with results again supporting the hypothesis that memory for threat-
relevant information is enhanced in a population with high anxiety. In addtion to OCD 
populations, a memory bias for threat-relevant information has also been shown in individuals 
high in social anxiety (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 2009; Cody & Teachman, 2010), in individuals 
with an eating disorders (Jiang & Vartanian, 2012), with a panic disorder (Cloitre & Liebowitz, 
1991), and in those with a generalized anxiety disorder (Coles, Turk, & Heimberg, 2007). 
Importantly, these studies demonstrate that anxiety does not engender a memory bias for 
negative information in general. Instead, individual differences play a role in determining what 
information is attended to and eventually remembered.  
The overall goal of this thesis was to determine whether initial encoding contexts can 
influence incidental, irrelevant stimuli (foil words), thus conferring a memory advantage to them. 
In our first experiment, we examined memory for foils (Jacoby 2005a; 2005b) in individuals 
with high and low trait anxiety to determine whether the targets encoded within a negative 
background context could confer a ‘negative-tinge’ to the foils on the recognition test for targets. 
Anxious individuals have demonstrated a tendency to attend to (Coles & Heimberg, 2002; 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Rinck & Becker, 2006) and difficulty disengaging attention 
from (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Huijding & de Jong, 
2005) negative information. As such, we compared high and low anxiety groups in an attempt to 
identify any role that anxiety may play in downstream memory bias. 
Anxious individuals may only exhibit a memory advantage for threat-relevant 
information (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001), as opposed to negative 
information in general. Additionally, the wide array of negative stimuli may have produced an 
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inconsistent affect response between participants. In Experiment 2, to address this issue, we 
targeted individuals who reported a fear directed toward a specific phobic stimulus (i.e., spider 
phobia). Spider fearfuls, and a control group of non-spider fearful individuals, completed the 
memory-for-foils paradigm studying target words over threat-relevant spider background 
contexts or neutral animal backgrounds. The goal of our second research experiment then was to 
determine whether a threat-relevant encoding context would produce a more profound taint of 





Chapter 2: Negative Context Influences Memory for Foils 
 One possibility that follows from the source-constrained hypothesis is that ruminating or 
dwelling on past events in a negative manner can influence encoding of objects or stimuli that 
are present in the current environment while in that mindset. Remembering events through a 
negative lens effectively re-activates the negative mode of processing initially engaged at 
encoding. In line with previous work (Bowen & Kensinger, 2017; Senn & Radomsky, 2012), this 
reactivated negative mindset could in turn taint current circumstances and incidental stimuli 
(e.g., foils) present within one’s environment, conferring on them an unintentional memory 
benefit.  
2.1 Experiment 1 
In the current study, we adapted Jacoby’s memory for foils paradigm to 1) extend the 
source-constrained retrieval hypothesis to contrast effects derived from a negative versus neutral 
encoding context, and 2) to determine whether there are individual differences in the degree to 
which a negative or neutral context can influence subsequent memory for foils. To investigate 
the latter, we compared performance in individuals classified with high versus low levels of trait 
anxiety. Such a finding would extend those of other work (Senn & Radomsky, 2012; Vogelsang 
et al., 2016) by suggesting that neutral information can become associated with, or tainted by, a 
negative context by virtue of invoking a constrained search of memory. As a consequence, the 
negatively-tainted information will be more memorable compared to information associated with 
a neutral context (Bishop, Dalgleish, & Yule, 2004; Bradley et al., 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 
1996; Danion et al., 1995; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a, 2003b).  
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Based on past research, we anticipate a memory advantage on Test 1, for words studied 
in a negative context. Additionally, as a result of being associated with the negative information, 
a memory advantage may be conferred on the foil words within the negative Test 1 subtest 
block. As a consequence, recognition performance for the negative foil words, assessed on Test 
2, will be higher than for foils derived from the neutral Test 1 subtest.  
To make recognition judgments, the signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) 
proposes that each individual selects a criterion level of familiarity and assumes that memory 
traces for each item have a quantified strength value associated with them. If the strength of the 
trace is above the criterion, then the item is registered as old; those that are below the criterion 
are deemed new. Past literature suggests that participants adopt a more liberal response bias 
when completing a recognition test for emotional, in comparison to neutral, information (Dougal 
& Rotello, 2007; Kapucu, Rotello, Ready, & Seidl, 2008). However, no research has explored 
whether response patterns or biases can also be reactivated or will influence how we perceive 
incidental stimuli. Hence, in addition to memory performance, we compared response bias 
patterns adopted by each anxiety group at both Test 1 and Test 2. We expected to see a more 
liberal response bias for the negative (Test 1) and negatively-tinged (Test 2) words, replicating 
findings from previous work (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). Moreover, we 
sought to determine what role individual differences might play in influencing the response 
criteria on either Test 1 or Test 2. 
2.1.1 Method 
Participants 
Eighty undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo (64 females) completed 
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the experiment for partial course credit. Forty participants were randomly assigned to a deep 
encoding instruction group (mean age = 19.98 years, SD = 2.03, range = 16-26) and 40 were 
randomly assigned to a shallow encoding group (mean age = 20.18 years, SD = 4.50, range = 17-
46). 
All participants completed the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995; DASS). The scales contains 42 items, 14 of which are dedicated to measuring each 
separate construct. An individual item consists of a statement that participants are instructed to 
provide a rating indicating how much the statement relates to them over the past week. Ratings 
are made on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3, where 0 represents no relation to the statement, 
and 3 indicates that the statement relates to them a lot.  
The participant sample was also divided into two separate groups based on the median of 
the sample anxiety ratings for the whole group. The median score for anxiety was 7.5 (SD = 
8.27). Median scores for depression and stress were 4 (SD = 9.18) and 11.5 (SD = 8.99), 
respectively. Hence, the ‘high anxiety’ group consisted of participants with mean anxiety scores 
higher than 7.5 (deep encoding group N = 20; shallow encoding group N = 20), and the 
remainder were categorized into the ‘low anxiety’ group (deep encoding group N = 20; shallow 
encoding group N = 20). 
We conducted independent sample t-tests to determine whether the high and low anxiety 
groups differed on depression or stress as reported on the DASS. Results of the t-test comparing 
mean trait depression indicated a significant difference in mean depression (t(78) = 5.31, p < 
.001), whereby the high anxiety group (M = 12.83, SD = 10.26) reported a higher depression 
level than the low anxiety group (M = 3.43, SD = 4.44). Similarly, there was a significant 
difference in trait stress levels (t(78) = 5.51, p < .001), whereby the high anxiety group (M = 
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17.73, SD = 8.84) reported a higher level of stress than the low anxiety group (M = 8.28, SD = 
6.30). 
Materials 
Photos used as visual context. Pictures used as background visual context were taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The IAPS is 
a database of pictures with normative ratings for valence, arousal, and dominance based on a 9-
point Likert scale. Two sets of pictures were created for the study. One set consisted of 36 
pictures that were negative in valence (M = 2.51, SD = .46) and the other set consisted of 36 
pictures that were neutral in valence (M = 5.06, SD = .56). Normative arousal ratings were 
matched across the negative (M = 5.01, SD = .63) and neutral pictures sets (M = 4.86, SD = .73). 
The selected pictures were re-sized to the dimensions of 11.7 cm x 8.8 cm from their original 
size of 26 cm x 19.5 cm to fit on the computer monitor. 
         
Figure 1. Sample IAPS picture stimuli of negative (left) and neutral (right) context images. 
Words used as targets and foils. Words were selected from the Affective Norms for 
English Words database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). The ANEW consists of a set of English words 
with normative ratings for valence, arousal, and dominance. All words selected from the 
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database were concrete nouns. Two unique 36-item word lists were created as the study lists. For 
Test 1, each of these lists was intermixed among a different set of 36 foil words in separate 
subtests. A separate, unique set of 72 foils was used as lure words on Test 2. Word lists were 
matched on normative valence and arousal ratings across the negative (valence M = 5.7, SD = 
1.24; arousal M = 4.71, SD = .87), and neutral (valence M = 5.42, SD = 1.37; arousal M = 4.79, 
SD = .82) target lists, and the negative (valence M = 5.77, SD = .96, arousal M = 4.52, SD = .87) 
and neutral (valence M = 5.6, SD = .86; arousal M = 4.36, SD = .86) foil lists. Word lists are 
shown in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the experiment individually using a desktop computer (19” 
monitor). Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled using E-Prime 2.0 (E-
prime v.2.2 software, Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). Participants provided 
signed consent before providing demographic information, including age, gender, years of 
education, and age that the participant had learned English. Participants then completed the 
DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) either as the first or final phase of the experiment to ensure 
the scales had no influence on test responses. For this scale, each item was displayed on the 
computer monitor. Participants were given a total of 5 seconds to respond to each statement with 
a keypress indicating their endorsement of the statement.  
The study consisted of a 2 X 2 X 2 design, with Encoding Context Valence (negative or 
neutral) as a within-participant factor, and Encoding Instruction Group (shallow or deep) and 
Anxiety Group (low or high) as between-participant factors. 
Encoding phase. Participants were presented with a set of 72 words (in 105 point white 
14 
 
Sans font with a .14 cm black border) overlayed onto individual IAPS pictures (26 cm by 19.5 
cm) in sequential trials, and were informed that their memory for the words would later be 
assessed. The 72 word-picture set was divided into 2 separate sublists, one for words overlayed 
onto negative IAPS pictures and another for words overlayed onto neutral IAPS pictures. 
Henceforth, these sublists will be referred to as ‘negative study words’ and ‘neutral study words’. 
The order in which the sublists were studied was counterbalanced across participants. For each 
trial, participants were instructed to study each word and to respond to two questions that 
appeared below the word-context pair, one at a time. For those in the shallow encoding group the 
first question asked them to indicate whether the word displayed on that trial contained the vowel 
‘a’. For the deep encoding group, the first question asked them to indicate whether the word 
displayed onscreen represented an object that was living or non-living. Responses for each group 
were made by pressing the A or D key on a QWERTY keyboard. To avoid the possibility that 
participants could evade or not attend to the picture that was used a context, participants in both 
encoding groups also answered a matching question; they indicated (arbitrarily) whether the 
word represented an object similar to the contents of the picture (by pressing the 4 or 6 key on 
the number pad of a QWERTY keyboard). Each question remained on the screen for 4 seconds, 
regardless of when the participant responded, thus providing 8 seconds in total, per study trial. A 
fixation cross was displayed between each trial for 250 msec.  
Intentional Recognition Test 1. Following the Encoding Phase, participants completed an 
intentional recognition test for words presented alone (i.e. without picture context), divided into 
two subtests. Each subtest contained either the negative study words or neutral study words as 
targets, intermixed among a unique set of foil words. Thus, each subtest contained a total of 72 
words (36 studied targets and 36 foils). The subtest containing the negative study words will be 
15 
 
referred to as ‘negative recognition test’; and the subtest containing the neutral study words will 
be referred to as ‘neutral recognition test’. On each recognition test trial, a word (in white 
Courier New font at 26 point) was shown in the centre of the computer monitor. Participants 
were instructed to determine whether the word was ‘old’ or ‘new’, by pressing the J or L key on 
a QWERTY keyboard. Each word remained on the screen until a response was provided, 
followed immediately by the subsequent target word. Prior to beginning a subtest, participants 
were told whether the target words were derived from either the sublist of negative study words 
or of neutral study words. The order in which each recognition subtest was completed was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Incidental Recognition Test 2. A surprise recognition test was subsequently administered 
for the 36 foil words (same font and size as at encoding) from the negative and the 36 from the 
neutral recognition tests. These 72 foil words were intermixed among a brand new set of 72 foils, 
thus forming a recognition test totalling 144 words. Participants were told to identify a word as 
‘old’ if they remembered seeing it in the previous phase, or ‘new’ (never seen in this 
experiment), by pressing the J or L key on a QWERTY keyboard.  
2.1.2 Results 
For Test 1, accuracy rates for target word memory were derived from the negative and 
neutral study sublists. Accuracy was calculated as hit rate (total hits divided by 36) minus false 
alarm rate (total false alarms divided by 36). For Test 2, accuracy rates were calculated as hit rate 
for foil words derived from the negative or neutral Test 1 subtest (total hits for each separate 
recognition test divided by 36) minus the overall false alarm rate on Test 2 (total false alarms 
divided by 72).   
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Test 1: Intentional Recognition of Studied Targets 
We conducted a 2 (Recognition Test Valence: negative, neutral contexts) X 2 (Anxiety 
Groups: high, low trait anxiety groups) X 2 (Encoding Instruction Group: deep, shallow 
encoding groups) repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy rates on Test 1. Main effects were 
not significant for Recognition Test Valence, Anxiety Group, or Encoding Instruction Group. 
Two-way interactions were also non-significant. 
The three-way interaction was marginally significant (F(1, 76) = 3.08, MSE = .02, ηp2 = 
.04 p = .08). For the deep encoding instruction group, participants who were low in anxiety 
displayed significantly lower recognition accuracy (t(19) = -2.5, p = .02) on the negative 
recognition test (M = .55, SD = 34) than on the neutral recognition test (M = .63, SD = .35). 
Conversely, the opposite pattern materialized for the high anxiety group, whereby participants 
had a higher accuracy rate on the negative (M = .55, SD = .40) than on the neutral recognition 
test (M = .50, SD = .55), though this difference was non-significant. For the shallow encoding 
instruction group, there were no significant differences in recognition accuracy amongst the low 
anxiety group between the negative (M = .64, SD = 16) and the neutral (M = 62, SD = .11) 
recognition test, or among the high anxiety group for the negative (M = .56, SD = .28) and the 







Experiment 1 Test 1: Memory Performance for Participants in the Deep and Shallow 
Encoding Conditions, with High versus Low Trait Anxiety 
 Deep  Shallow 
 High Low  High Low 
Hit Rate     
Negative .70(.18) .69(.21) .70(.13) .71(.15) 
Neutral .68(.24) .73(.20) .70(.18) .68(.11) 
False Alarm Rate     
Negative .15(.24) .14(.18) .14(.21) .08(.07) 
Neutral .19(.33) .10(.19) .12(.21) .06(.05) 
Accuracy Rate     
Negative .55(.40) .55(.34) .56(.28) .64(.16) 
Neutral .50(.55) .63(.35) .59(.28) .62(.11) 
 
Test 2: Incidental Memory for Foils 
We conducted a 2 (Foil Valence: foils derived from the negative or neutral Test 1 blocks) 
X 2 (Anxiety Groups: high, low trait anxiety groups) X 2 (Encoding Instruction Group: deep, 
shallow encoding groups) repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy rate on Test 2. The main 
effect of Foil Valence was not significant. The main effects for Anxiety Group and Encoding 
Instruction Group were also non-significant. All two-way interactions were non-significant. 
There was, however, a significant three-way interaction (F(1, 76) = 4.46, MSE < .01, ηp2 = .06, p 
< .04). For those in the shallow encoding condition, the effect of Anxiety Group interacted with 
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Foil Valence: High anxiety participants had higher recognition accuracy for foils derived from 
the negative Test 1 recognition subtest (M = .54, SD = .26) than from the neutral subtest (M = 
.50, SD = .28), and this difference was marginally significant (t(19) = 1.9, p = .07). In contrast, 
the low anxiety participants had a slightly lower accuracy rate on the negative (M = .55, SD = 
.14) recognition subtest, compared to the neutral (M = .59, SD = .14) subtest. Note that though 
accuracy rates differed by the same amount for both high and low anxiety groups, the difference 
was not significant for the low anxiety participants.  
In the deep encoding condition, there were no differences in accuracy rate for high 
anxiety participants for negative (M = .48, SD = .29) and neutral (M = .48, SD = .28) foils. 
Similarly, recognition accuracy in the low anxiety group was about equal for negative (M = .56, 















Experiment 1 Test 2: Memory for Foils and False Alarm Rate for Participants in the Deep 
and Shallow Encoding Condition, with High versus Low Trait Anxiety. 
 Deep  Shallow 
 High Low  High Low 
Hit Rate     
Negative .72(.19) .78(.17) .75(.25) .78(.18) 
Neutral .72(.21) .76(.16) .71(.25) .81(.17) 
False Alarm Rate .24(.21) .22(.20) .22(.18) .23(.10) 
Accuracy Rate     
Negative .48(.29) .56(.21) .54(.26) .55(.14) 
Neutral .48(.28) .54(.25) .50(.28) .59(.14) 
 
Response Bias 
 Previous research has suggested that participants adopt a more liberal response bias when 
attempting to recall negative, in contrast to neutral, information (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; 
Kapucu, Rotello, Ready, & Seidl, 2008). To investigate response bias in our sample, we 
calculated criterion C for each participant for negative or neutral information on both Test 1 and 
Test 2. 
Intentional Recognition Test 1. We conducted a 2 (Recognition Test Valence: negative, 
neutral contexts) X 2 (Anxiety Groups: high, low trait anxiety groups) X 2 (Encoding Instruction 
Group: deep, shallow encoding groups) repeated measures ANOVA for response bias measure 
C. Results of the analysis revealed a significant main effect of Recognition Test Valence on 
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response bias (F(1,76) = 36.76, MSE = .04, η2 = .33, p < .001), whereby participants adopted a 
more liberal response bias for the words studied in a negative context. However, there were no 
main effects for Anxiety Group or for Encoding Instruction Group. All two-way interactions 
between Encoding Instruction Groups and Recognition Test Valence were not significant. Three-
way interaction between Recognition Test Valence, Anxiety Groups, and Encoding Instructions 
Groups was also not significant. 
Incidental Recognition Test 2. We conducted a 2 (Foil Valence: foils derived from the 
negative or neutral Test 1 blocks) X 2 (Anxiety Groups: high, low trait anxiety groups) X 2 
(Encoding Instruction Group: deep, shallow encoding groups) repeated measures ANOVA for 
response bias measure C. Results of the analysis revealed no significant main effect of Foil 
Valence, nor was there a significant main effect for Anxiety Group or for Encoding Instruction 
Group. All two-way interactions were also not significant. There was, however, a significant 
three-way interaction between Foil Valence, Anxiety Group, and Encoding Instruction Group 
(F(1,76) = 5.38, MSE = .02, η2 = .07, p < .05). Paired samples t-test revealed that this interaction 
was mainly driven by high trait anxiety participants who had studied words using a shallow 
encoding instruction as this group adopted a significantly more conservative response bias for 
foils derived from the neutral test compared to those from the negative test (t(1, 19) = 2.27, p < 







Experiment 2 Test 2: Response Bias Measure Criterion C for Participants with High 
versus Low Fear of Spiders (standard deviation in parentheses).  
 Deep  Shallow 
 High Low  High Low 
Negative .05(.47) -.01(.55) .02(.59) -.04(.46) 
Neutral .04(.53) .03(.44) .11(.58) -.12(.45) 
 
2.1.3 Discussion 
The goal of this study was to investigate whether benefits offered by a constrained search 
to recognition memory could extend to information learned within that emotional context. Past 
work suggests that when making recognition memory decisions we re-enter the mode of 
processing engaged at encoding so as to constrain the memory search (Jacoby et al., 2005a; 
2005b); As such, new information (foils) present during the recognition test is encoded using the 
same processing mode and reaps its benefits (or costs) on subsequent memory tests.  Using the 
memory-for-foils paradigm, we examined whether foils from a recognition test of ‘negatively-
tinged’ targets, compared to ‘neutrally-tinged’ targets, would later be better remembered. We 
also compared this effect across individuals high versus low in anxiety, based on a median split 
of DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) scores. We predicted that participants would 
demonstrate memory enhancement for foils derived from a recognition test for target words 
learned in a negative context as compared to a neutral context. In addition, we hypothesized that 
this memory enhancement would be greater for those with high trait anxiety. 
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We found a significant three-way Anxiety Group by Encoding Instruction Group by Test 
1 Context interaction on Test 2 performance, whereby high trait anxiety participants who had 
studied words using a shallow encoding instruction demonstrated a higher accuracy rate for 
‘negatively-tinged’ foils. Results support both of our hypotheses, with a caveat: Participants 
displayed higher recognition for target foil words intermixed among those learned in a negative 
context, though this memory advantage was seen only in participants with high trait anxiety. 
Findings from the study suggest that initial encoding context can create a downstream memory 
bias, and as such our results extend the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis to emotional 
contexts. Our results also suggest that negative encoding contexts produce a particularly salient 
bias for high anxiety individuals. Memory for neutral stimuli, particularly among high anxiety 
individuals, may become tainted by the mode of processing engaged when such stimuli were 
incidentally encountered. In being tainted by the reactivated negative mode of processing, the 
foil words, or incidental stimuli, became particularly salient and meaningful to the participant, 
thus becoming more memorable. However, this pattern was observed only for those in the 
Shallow and not in the Deep Encoding Instruction group.  This aspect of the results will be 
discussed separately below. 
Support for our interpretation comes from other studies showing that neutral stimuli 
incidentally presented, or associated with, a negative or threatening context becomes tainted 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). As such, otherwise neutral stimuli seem to become affiliated with the 
retrieved threat-related information. As suggested by past related work, any memory 
enhancement that the individual harboured for the original threat transfers to the neutral stimuli, 
making these incidental stimuli more memorable as well (Bowen & Kensinger, 2017; Senn & 
Radomsky, 2012). Notably, in our study, the downstream memory bias for ‘negatively-tinged’ 
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foils was only demonstrated by high trait anxiety participants. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that the amount of attentional resources directed toward threat-relevant stimuli may 
differ. For high anxiety individuals, it has been shown that threat-relevant stimuli recruit 
significant attentional (Bishop et al., 2004, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010) and working memory 
(Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013) resources. In being tainted by the negative context, the 
otherwise neutral stimuli may now occupy more working memory space. This is reflected in our 
results, whereby a negative context leads to similar memorial boosts, albeit only for the foils 
encountered while re-evaluating targets for membership in the ‘negative-context’ study list. 
Previous research has explored constrained memory search for words that were encoded 
with various levels of processing (Jacoby et al., 2005a, 2005b; Danckert, MacLeod, & 
Fernandes, 2011). In these studies, participants demonstrated a recognition bias for foils derived 
from tests of words that had initially been processed deeply, as opposed to shallowly. In our 
study, however, we manipulated the level of processing across groups, and failed to find a main 
effect of depth of processing on Test 2 performance. In fact, there were no differences between 
the groups until Anxiety Group and Foil Valence were taken into consideration. Unlike many 
other studies exploring constrained memory search (Alban & Kelley, 2012; Danckert, MacLeod, 
& Fernandes, 2011; Halamish et al., 2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2013; Marsh et al., 2009), our 
study implemented an emotional context manipulation in conjunction with a depth of processing 
instruction at the time of encoding. The discrepancy between the findings in our study and those 
of prior works suggests that the inclusion of an emotional context at encoding altered the 
eventual downstream memory bias, reducing any effect from depth of processing alone. One 
possible explanation is that there is a maximal amount of benefit memory can receive from a 
particular encoding strategy. As a consequence of studying words using a deep encoding 
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instruction, the benefit offered by emotional valence could not be observed (i.e. memory 
performance was already high). In contrast to the deep instruction, a shallow mode of processing 
offers relatively less benefit to memory. Here the negative contexts may have had more leeway 
to provide an observable benefit.  
Another possible explanation is that processing words using a deep encoding instruction 
diverts attention away from the emotional context. By definition, a deep encoding instruction 
requires the participant to recall various aspects involving the target word, drawing on previous 
memory traces and associations with the word’s meaning. Consequently, neutral words activate a 
wide variety of previously formed emotional episodic traces, and attention is directed toward the 
target study word and away from the context picture. Conversely, words encoded using a shallow 
instruction are not accompanied by the reactivation of former episodic traces. Shallow encoding 
instructions only involve reading the word and understanding the physical features of the 
lettering used to spell it (i.e., whether there is the vowel ‘a’ in the word). Knowledge of the given 
word’s meaning is irrelevant and unnecessary for the encoding instruction. As such, no previous 
memory traces are activated, allowing for the current encoding context to be associated with the 
target word. The result is a memory advantage for negatively-tainted foils in the shallow 
condition and no effect of emotion for those who studied words using a deep encoding 
instruction. In this case, anxious individuals do show a memory advantage for negatively-tinged 
information and receive a benefit from the negative pictures, relative to the low anxiety group. 
However, this effect can only be seen when words are studied using a shallow encoding 






Additionally, we found that participants replicated the liberal response bias pattern for 
words studied within an emotional context on Test 1 (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu, Rotello, 
Ready, & Seidl, 2008). Interestingly, on Test 2, high trait anxiety participants who studied words 
using a shallow level of encoding also adopted a more liberal response pattern for the foils 
derived from the neutral test in comparison to the foils for the negative test. This effect was not 
shown for the low trait anxiety group or for the group who had studied words using a deep level 
of encoding. Previous work has not explored response bias patterns with regard to trait anxiety 
differences. Although there were no differences for these groups during Test 1, our findings 
suggest that anxiety may lead to alterations in response bias downstream. 
No Memory Advantage on Test 1 
One aspect of our data which requires further explanation, however, is the absence of the 
expected memory advantage for negative target words on Test 1. The lack of effect may have 
occurred because our chosen visual negative contexts produced inconsistent affective responses 
across participants. That is, in our study, the pictures used as negative contexts consisted of a 
wide variety of content (e.g. blood, cemeteries, automobile accidents). As suggested by 
Radomsky and Rachman (1999), a memory advantage for emotional material might only be 
evident when presented with stimuli that are particularly threatening to that individual. Due to 
the variety of negative pictures used, a given participant may consider one picture threatening, 
stimulating a high affective response, whereas another participant might not perceive the same 
picture as a threat. For example, one participant may be upset by the sight of blood shown in 
some of the pictures, whereas others may not. We should not expect a memory advantage for a 
word accompanied by a non-threatening picture, since the taint of a non-threatening picture 
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would effectively be similar to that from a neutral picture. Future studies could examine a 
possible downstream memory effect when the visual context at study is more consistently related 
to a specific threat, in subgroups of anxious participants (e.g., spider pictures in spider-phobics).  
Memory for Foils Effect 
Why then was there a downstream effect on memory for the foils? Guez and Naveh-
Benjamin (2013) suggest that the influence of a particular manipulation on memory (in their case 
divided attention, and here, emotional context) may become more pronounced over longer time 
frames, as consolidation of the memory takes place. Given the relatively short amount of elapsed 
time between study and Test 1 in our paradigm, the benefit conferred to targets overlayed onto 
negative versus neutral contexts may not have yet emerged. That is, memory for the neutral-
context targets was high, though if we had delayed Test 1, it is possible that differential 
forgetting may have occurred, allowing us to see the expected memorial benefit for targets 
encoded with a negative context.  Given our paradigm, it is therefore even more remarkable that 
we observed the memory for foils effect for the negative Test 1 foils. Clearly our manipulation of 
context produced some difference in how the ‘negative-context’ versus ‘neutral-context’ targets 
were subsequently evaluated, and this differential evaluation was applied to the foils contained 
on each test, resulting in the differential memory for foils. 
Results from Experiment 1 support our hypothesis that initial encoding context (whether 
negative or neutral) can influence later memory for incidental stimuli (the foils). While we did 
find a difference in memory performance on Test 2, we did not find the anticipated emotional 
context benefit on Test 1. As described above, one of the possible explanations is that each 
unique context led to various affective, physiological arousal responses across participants. 
According to the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), optimal performance requires a 
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moderate level of physiological arousal. Therefore, participants who are very strongly affected 
by one image would have their memory performance influenced differently than those who are 
less emotionally affected. As a means to address this possible alternative explanation, in 
Experiment 2 we changed the negative visual contexts at encoding to be all of one type.  
Specifically, we replaced these contexts with spider images and examined the influence of this 
visual context within our paradigm, in individuals with high versus low fear of spiders. In so 
doing, we could better control the affective state created by the ‘negative-context’ images in 







Chapter 3: Threat-Relevant Context Influences Memory for Foils 
In Experiment 1, we found that high trait anxiety participants demonstrated a downstream 
memory advantage for negatively-tainted foil words. One limitation of our study, however, was 
the inconsistent affective response to the negative context images. For example, while some 
participants may respond rather strongly to the sight of blood, others may be relatively 
unaffected, despite the sight of gore and physical injury being a generally negative event. In this 
case, we may have induced a wide range of physiological arousal responses between 
participants. As explained above, according to the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908), optimal performance requires a moderate level of physiological arousal. Therefore, 
images containing blood could have produced an arousal level that was too high to produce 
optimal performance for some participants. Conversely, participants who are unaffected by the 
sight of blood would have had an arousal response below the ideal moderate point. To address 
this potential issue, in Experiment 2, we collected data from a sample group who self-reported a 
specific fear and used threat-relevant images as contexts.  
Spider Phobia and Cogntiive Biases 
 Extensive empirical evidence has illustrated that spider fearfuls demonstrate various 
cogntiive biases toward threatening spider cues. One such cogntiive process is implicit memory 
bias. Automatic processes are an integral contributor to the etiology of spider fear (Merckelbach, 
de Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996). These automatic processes are often reflected in implicit 
tests of memory whereby spider fearfuls have been shown to more readily associate negativity 
with spider images (Teachman & Woody, 2003; Huijding & de Jong, 2005) or with avoidant 
behaviours (Rinck & Becker, 2007). Critically, these behaviours are exhibited by spider phobics 
only when presented with stimuli that contain the designated threatening stimulus, spiders. For 
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example, using the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), 
Teachman and Woody (2003) showed that spider phobics quickly associated spider images with 
negative terms, however they did not do so for pictures of snakes. 
Spider phobics report their initial fear reactions as irrational and out of their intentional 
control (Mayer, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000), suggesting an immediate emotional 
acknowledgement and awareness of the threatening cue. Anxiety has been shown to elicit 
attentional biases toward sources of threat (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). When presented with threatening stimuli, spider threat cues have been shown to draw the 
attention of spider phobic subjects (Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). 
This effect has been replicated in eye-tracking studies as well, suggesting that when a threat cue 
is presented, eye gaze immediately redirects to the spider image (Rinck & Becker, 2006).  
Alhough the literature on explicit memory biases among the anxious population is mixed 
(see Mitte, 2008, for review), there is some evidence to suggest that spider phobics may 
demonstrate a memory advantage for spider stimuli. In multiple experiments, Wessel and 
Merkelbach (1998, 1997) found that spider phobics demonstrated a memory advantage to spider 
images. Empirical evidence supports alterations to several cognitive processes among spider 
phobics, including attention and both implicit and explicit memory bias, toward spider-related 
cues. Utilizing these cognitive biases, we aimed to determine whether a memory advantage 
would be displayed for words studied within a spider-related context (Test 1), and whether this 
memory advantage, if any, would be conferred on Test 2, on incidental stimuli, the foils that 




3.1 Experment 2 
In Experiment 2, instead of using the wide array of negative images used in Experiment 
1, we presented participants with spider images in our ‘negative-visual-context’ encoding 
condition. Moreover, neutral images were replaced with non-insect, non-spider animal pictures 
to control for the semantic distinction between the living and non-living categories of stimuli. 
Extensive work has shown that continued exposure to threatening images reduces anxiety to the 
threat (Mathews, Mackintosh, Williams, Williams, & Kirkby, 2016; Mathews, Naran, & Kirkby, 
2015). The decline in fear response, has even been demonstrated using a single half-hour 
presentation of fearful spider images (Muller, Kull, Wilhelm, & Michael, 2011). To reduce the 
potential that participants would habituate to the threatening spider images, one third of the 
visual-context images at encoding were GIF files. Hence, the participants in this experiment 
studied words overlayed onto spider images, or spider-GIFs, which were threat-relevant for 
spider-phobics, or animal images and animal-GIFs, which were neutral for all participants. 
One of the limitations of Experiment 1 was our inability to verify whether participants 
had the intended affective response following each study list, which is problematic for two 
reasons. First, we could not confirm whether participants found the negative context pictures 
more negative compared to the neutral pictures. As such, we could not fully confirm whether the 
negative encoding context condition produced the intended affective response. Participants may 
have had the same emotional response to the negative and neutral pictures. It may seem odd to 
think that a picture of blood would be rated as negatively as a picture of a boat. However, since 
we did not include a manipulation check, we were unable to confirm a difference in emotional 
response between encoding conditions. Second, we could not determine whether memory 
performance is due to changes in valence or arousal. Although context pictures were controlled 
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across groups for normative arousal ratings, participants may have had varying physiological 
arousal responses to the negative compared to the neutral pictures. For example, an image of 
blood may produce a stronger physiological response than an image of a boat. As previously 
discussed, arousal has a role to play in memory performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). To 
account for potential changes in arousal and to verify whether encoding context conditions 
produced the intended affective response, we included the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; 
Bradley & Lang, 1994) to collect self-reports of valence and arousal at baseline prior to either 
study list, following the spider study list and following the animal study list.  
In line with previous studies, an emotional memory boost may only be displayed when 
anxious individuals are presented with information that they find particularly threatening. As 
such, we predicted that participants who reported a high fear of spiders would demonstrate a 
memory advantage for the words studied within the spider context (Test 1), and that this memory 
boost would then be conferred on the foil words from the Test 1 subtest for targets overlayed 
onto spider images (and GIFs), when foil memory was assessed on Test 2.  
Moreover, in Experiment 1, we had replicated previous findings that participants adopt a 
more liberal response bias when presented with emotional, as opposed to neutral, information 
during Test 1 (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). In Experiment 2, we therefore 
expected that high spider fearful participants would be more liberal in their memory response 
pattern (Becker & Rinck, 2004). Thus, in addition to differences in memory performance, we 
predicted that spider fearful participants would be more liberal in reporting that they had seen 






 Three participants were excluded from analysis due to memory accuracy scores lower 
than 0 on Test 1. After exclusions, eighty-four participants completed the study (70 females, M 
age = 20.68, SD = 5.18, Range = 17-57 years). Participants were enrolled in undergraduate 
Psychology classes and received course credit for their participation. Prior to signing up for the 
study, participants completed the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & 
O’Donohue, 1995) during initial pre-screen testing. When first joining the SONA subject pool at 
the University of Waterloo, prospective participants completed a series of questionnaires, 
including the FSQ. Using these pre-screen mass testing scores, participants who scored in the top 
and bottom 25% were given permission to sign up for the study. Of the 2569 participants who 
completed the questionnaire, 1138 (695 in the top 25%, 443 in the bottom 25%) qualified for the 
study. Those scoring in the top 25% were categorized into the High Fear of Spiders group (N = 
42, mean FSQ score = 90.62, SD = 15.28, mean age = 19.95 years, SD age = 4.11, age range = 
17 - 44), while participants in the bottom 25% were assigned to the Low Fear of Spiders group 
(N = 42, mean FSQ score = 18.20, SD = .40, mean age = 21.40 years, SD age = 6.03, age range = 
18 - 57). Participants were recruited in accordance with ethical guidelines governing the use of 
humans in research.  
High and low fear of spider group mean scores were calculated separately. Scores from 
time at test and during pre-screen are shown in Table 4. Although mean scores in both groups 
were higher at study than during pre-screen measures, the high fear of spiders group still reported 
a significantly higher mean FSQ score than the low fear of spiders group (t(82) = 17.47, p < 




Fear of Spiders Questionnaire Ratings for Participants with High and Low Fear of Spiders 
during Pre-screen, and at Study (standard deviation in parentheses). 
 High Fear of Spiders Group  Low Fear of Spiders Group 
Pre-screen Test 90.62(15.28) 18.20(.40) 
Study 103.2(13.89) 36.83(20.25) 
 
Materials 
 Context Pictures. Pictures used as background visual context contained either images of 
spiders (24 pictures) or non-insect animals (24 pictures). The spider pictures were selected from 
a database of spider images used in previous studies investigating fear of spiders. The animal 
pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008). Pictures were neutral in normative valence (M = 5.91, SD = .81) and arousal (M 
= 4.53, SD = 1.03) as collected by the IAPS. Selected pictures were re-sized to the dimensions of 




                  
Figure 2. Sample picture stimuli of spider (left) and animal (right) context images. 
 Context GIFs. Past research has shown that exposure to images can be an effective 
treatment for spider phobia (Mathews et al., 2016; Mathews et al., 2015; Muller et al., 2011). In 
Experiment 2, unlike in Experiment 1, a third of the contexts were generated using GIF files to 
ensure participants did not become desensitized to the spider and animal images throughout the 
encoding phase. Both spider and animal GIFs were collected through an Internet search of 
various websites that provided public access to their images. Spider GIFs were selected to 
contain spiders moving in the centre of the image. Likewise, animal GIFs contained various 
animals that moved in the centre of the image.  
Words. As in Experiment 1, words were collected and compiled into lists for the 
encoding and test phases of the study. In Experiment 2, however, it was critical that the words 
were unrelated to animals and did not contain any animal nouns to ensure participant memory 
did not benefit from semantic relatedness (Baddeley, 1966). Words selected were concrete, non-
animal nouns selected from the Affective Norms for English Words database (Bradley & Lang, 
1999). Two unique 36-item word lists were created as the study lists. For Test 1, each of the lists 
was intermixed among a novel set of 36 foil words in separate subtests. An additional, unique set 
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of 72 foils were then used as lure words on Test 2. Word lists were matched on normative 
valence and arousal ratings across the list paired with spider pictures (valence M = 5.74, SD = 
1.67; arousal M = 4.51, SD = 2.32) and animal pictures (valence M = 5.72, SD = 1.67; arousal M 
= 4.50, SD = 2.27), and the foil lists paired with spider pictures (valence M = 5.77, SD = .96; 
arousal M = 4.5, SD = .87) and animal pictures (valence M = 5.60, SD = .86; arousal M = 4.36, 
SD = .85). Word lists are shown in Appendix B.  
Self-assessment Manikin. The self-assessment manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) 
was used to measure affective response at baseline and after exposure to the spider and animal 
pictures. The SAM consists of a series of images, and participants were instructed to select the 
image that best reflected their current mood valence and arousal levels. Participants were also 
able to indicate that their mood fell between two of the images.  
 
Figure 3a. Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) Valence scale, showing images depicting extremely 
positive (left) and extremely negative valence (right) states. 
 
Figure 3b. SAM Arousal scale showing images depicting extremely high physiological arousal 




 Participants completed the experiment individually using a desktop computer (19” 
monitor). Stimulus presentation and response recoding were controlled using E-Prime 2.0 (E-
prime v.2.2 software, Psychology Software Tools Inc. Pittsburgh, PA). Participants provided 
signed consent before providing demographic information, including age, gender, and age that 
the participant had learned English. 
Encoding phase. Participants were presented with a set of 72 words (in 105 point white 
Sans font with a .14 cm black border) overlayed onto pictures and GIF files (26 cm by 19.5 cm) 
in sequential trials, and were informed that their memory for the words would later be assessed. 
The 72 word-picture set was divided into 2 separate sublists, one for those words overlayed onto 
spider pictures and GIFs and another for words overlayed onto animal pictures and GIF files. 
Henceforth, these sublists will be referred to as the ‘spider study words’ and the ‘animal study 
words’. The order in which the sublists were studied was counterbalanced across participants. 
 For each trial, participants were instructed to study each word and to make a shallow 
encoding decision about whether the word shown on screen contained the vowel ‘a’. Responses 
were made by pressing the A or D key on a QWERTY keyboard with their dominant hand. To 
fix amount of study time for each word, the question remained on the screen for 4 seconds 
regardless of when the participant responded.  
 Prior to being shown any pictures or words, participants completed the SAM to report 
baseline valence and arousal levels. After being presented with the spider study words and the 
animal study words, participants completed the SAM again. In Experiment 1, no measure was in 
place to determine whether mood changed in the intended direction following the negative and 
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neutral study lists. In this study, we used the SAM to obtain self-report valence and arousal 
ratings to determine whether the threat-relevant and neutral conditions were producing the 
intended affective response. 
Intentional Recognition Test 1. Following the Encoding Phase, participants completed 
two subtests of an intentional recognition test, one for each sublist of the study words. Each 
subtest contained either the spider study words or the animal study words as targets, intermixed 
among a unique set of foil words. Thus, each subtest contained a total of 72 words (36 studied 
targets and 36 foils). The subtests containing the spider study words and the animal study words 
will be referred to as the spider recognition test and the animal recognition test, respectively. 
 On each recognition test trial, a word (white Courier New font at 26 point) was shown in 
the centre of the computer monitor. Participants were instructed to determine whether the word 
was ‘old’ or ‘new’ by pressing the J or L key on a QWERTY keyboard with their dominant 
hand. Each word remained on the screen until a response was provided, followed immediately by 
the subsequent target word. Prior to beginning each subtest, participants were told that the target 
words would be derived from either the spider study words or animal study words. For example, 
before starting the spider recognition test, participants were told that the ‘old’ words would have 
been studied in the spider study words sublist from the Encoding Phase.  
Incidental Recognition Test 2. As in Experiment 1, following Intentional Recognition 
Test 1, a surprise recognition test was administered. In this test, the 36 foil word sets (white 
Courier New font at 26 point) from each of the spider recognition test and the animal recognition 
test were used as target words. These 72 foil words were intermixed among a brand new set of 
72 foils, thus forming a recognition test totaling 144 words. Participants were instructed to 
determine whether the displayed word was ‘old’ or ‘new’ and to report their response by 
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pressing the J or L key on a QWERTY keyboard with their dominant hand. Each word remained 
on the screen until a response was provided and was followed immediately by the subsequent 
word.  
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire. Participants completed the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire 
(FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) again during the study to ensure that the fear of spiders 
groups remained different from one another according to fear of spiders self-reports. The FSQ is 
an 18-item scale containing statements all regarding a fear of spiders (i.e., “If I came across a 
spider now, I would get help from someone else to remove it”) and participants were instructed 
to indicate how much they agreed with each statement on a 7-point scale. Each item was 
displayed on the computer monitor and remained on screen until a response was provided. Once 
the participant had entered a response, the subsequent statement was immediately displayed. The 
order of the statements were randomized across participants.  
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale. Participants completed the 42-item Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Similar to Experiment 1, participants 
reported their responses on a 4-point scale from 1-4. Participants were instructed that they had 5 
seconds to record their response and that if a response was not provided then the current item 
would be skipped and the next item would be displayed. The order of the FSQ and DASS was 
randomized between participants. Anxiety, depression, and stress mean ratings for each spider 







Experiment 2: Mean Trait Anxiety, Depression, and Stress Ratings for High and Low Fear of 
Spiders Groups (standard deviation in parentheses). 
 High Fear of Spiders Group  Low Fear of Spiders Group 
Anxiety 26.43(7.90) 21.95(6.90) 
Depression 25.00(8.99) 21.33(7.51) 




 To determine whether the study lists had the intended effect on participant mood, we 
conducted separate ANOVAs for SAM valence and arousal scores.  
SAM Valence. Data were analyzed using a repeated measures 2 (Spider Fear Group: low 
fear of spiders, high fear of spiders) X 3 (Encoding Condition: baseline, post-animal study list, 
post-spider study list) ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of Encoding Condition (F(2, 
164) = 68.71, MSE = 1.37, η2 = .46, p < .001). There was also a significant between groups main 
effect comparing the high and low fear of spiders groups (F(1,82) = 14.08, MSE = 1.24, η2 = .15, 
p < .001). The Spider Fear Group X Encoding Condition interaction was also significant (F(2, 
164) = 13.95, MSE = 1.37, η2 = .15, p < .001). Simple effects contrasts indicated that high fear of 
spiders participants reported a significantly more negative valenced mood following the study 
block which contained the spider visual context images/GIFs compared to baseline reports (F(1, 
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41) = 81.95, MSE = 3.98, η2 = .67, p < .001) and compared to their reports following the study 
block which contained animal visual context images/GIFs (F(1, 41) = 64.64, MSE = 4.06, η2 = 
.61, p < .001).  This pattern, however, was also demonstrated by the low fear of spiders group, 
whereby a more negative valenced mood was reported following the spider-context study list 
compared to baseline (F(1, 41) = 20.02, MSE = 3.98, η2 = .33, p < .001) and compared to their 
reports following the animal-context study list (F(1, 41) = 25.43, MSE = 4.06, η2 = .38, p < 
.001). Post animal study list and baseline reports were not significantly different for either group. 
To further understand the between-groups differences, we conducted independent sample t-tests 
to compare valence data between the groups. 
 
Figure 4. Mean SAM Valence ratings for the low and high Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) 
groups at baseline, following study of the animal list and following study of the spider list. 
 
We conducted independent sample t-tests to determine whether the high and low fear of 























phase. Independent sample t-tests revealed a significant Spider Fear Group difference after 
studying the spider-context study words (t(82) = 5.31, p < .001), whereby the high fear of spiders 
group reported a significantly more negative valence (M = 5.98, SD = 1.91) than the low fear of 
spiders group (M = 3.98, SD = 1.52). Importantly, there were no significant differences between 
the groups following the animal-context study words (high fear of spiders group: M = 3.48, SD 
1.35; low fear of spiders group: M = 2.95, SD = 1.29; t(82) = 1.82, p = .072), or following 
baseline (high fear of spiders group: M = 3.19, SD 1.25; low fear of spiders group: M = 2.98, SD 
= 1.39; t(82) = .74, p = .46). 
SAM Arousal. Data were analyzed using a repeated 2 (Spider Fear Group: low fear of 
spiders, high fear of spiders) X 3 (Encoding Condition: baseline, post-animal study list, post-
spider study list) ANOVA. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated (χ2(2) = 26.68, p < .001), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-
Feldt estimates of sphericity (ԑ = .80).There was a significant main effect of Encoding Condition 
(F(1.61, 131.69) = 29.99, MSE = 1.895 η2 = .27, p < .001). There was also a significant Spider 
Fear Groups effect (F(1,82) = 7.18, MSE = 7.31, η2 = .08, p < .01). The Spider Fear Group X 
Encoding Condition interaction was also significant (F(1.61, 131.69) = 9.46, MSE = 1.85, η2 = 
.10, p < .001). For the high fear of spiders group, simple effects contrasts revealed that 
participants reported a significantly higher arousal after the spider-context study list compared 
both to baseline (F(1, 41) = 32.51, MSE = 5.29, η2 = .44, p < .001) and to their reports following 
the animal-context study list (F(1, 41) = 35.58, MSE = 4.28, η2 = .46, p < .001).  This pattern was 
also found for the low fear of spiders group, albeit the difference was only marginally significant 
when comparing post-spider study list and post-animal study list reports (F(1, 41) = 4.22, MSE = 
4.28, η2 = .46, p = .05). Low spider fear group participants reported a significantly higher arousal 
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level following the spider study list than at baseline (F(1, 41) = 5.33, MSE = 5.29, η2 = .12, p < 
.05). To further understand the between groups difference, we conducted independent samples t-
tests to compare arousal data between the fear of spiders groups. 
 
Figure 5. Mean SAM Arousal ratings for the low and high Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) 
groups at baseline, following study of the animal list and following study of the spider list. 
 
 Independent t-tests revealed a significant difference between the fear of spiders groups 
(t(82) = 4.32, p < .001), whereby the high group reported significantly higher physiological 
arousal (M = 4.79, SD = 2.10) than the low fear of spiders group (M = 2.92, SD = 1.83). 
Importantly, as with the SAM valence data, there were no significant differences after the 
animal-context study words (high fear of spiders group: M = 2.88, SD = 1.88; low fear of spiders 
group: M = 2.31, SD = 1.56; t(82) = 1.14, p = .26) or at baseline (high fear of spiders group: M = 























Test 1: Intentional Memory for Studied Targets 
 For the Test 1 analysis, we calculated accuracy rates (hit rate – false alarm rate) for each 
subtest for each participant. We then conducted 2 (Spider Fear Groups: high fear of spiders 
group, low fear of spiders group) X 2 (Recognition Test Valence: spider recognition test, animal 
recognition test) repeated measures ANOVA to determine whether accuracy rate differed 
between groups for each subtest. 
 The 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of Recognition Test Valence 
(F(1,82) < .001, MSE = .02, η2 < .001, p = .99). The main effect of Spider Fear Group also was 
not significant (F(1,82) = 2.08, MSE = .03, η2 = .03, p = .15). The Recognition Test Valence X 
Spider Fear Group interaction was not significant (F(1,82) = 1.16, MSE = .02, η2 = .01, p = .28). 
Test 2: Incidental Memory for Foils 
 As with Test 1, we calculated subtest accuracy rates for participants. We then conducted 
a 2 (Spider Fear Groups: high fear of spiders group, low fear of spiders group) X 2 (Foil 
Valence: foils derived from the spider recognition test, foils derived from the animal recognition 
test) repeated measures ANOVA to compare accuracy rates. 
 Results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Foil Valence (F(1,82) = 
4.03, MSE = .01, η2 = .05, p < .05), whereby recognition of foils from the negative (spider) 
subtest (M = .29, SD = .16) was higher than accuracy of foils from the neutral (animal) subtest 
(M = .27, SD = .17). The main effect of Spider Fear Group was not significant (F(1,82) = .31, 
MSE = .05, η2 < .01, p = .58). There also was no significant interaction between the Foil Valence 




 Previous research has suggested that participants adopt a more liberal response bias when 
attempting to recall negative, in contrast to neutral, information (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Dougal 
& Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). To investigate response bias in our sample, we calculated 
criterion C for each participant for information tainted by threatening (spider) or neutral (animal) 
contexts on both Test 1 and Test 2. 
Intentional Recognition Test 1. We conducted a 2 (Recognition Test Valence: spider 
recognition subtest, animal recognition subtest) X 2 (Spider Fear Groups: high fear of spiders 
group, low fear of spiders group) repeated measures ANOVA for response bias measure C. 
Results of the analysis revealed no main effect of Recognition Test Valence (F(1,82) = 2.26, 
MSE = .05, η2 = .03, p = .14), nor an effect of Spider Fear Group (F(1,82) = .27, MSE = .23, η2 < 
.01, p = .61). The Recognition Test Valence X Spider Fear Group interaction was not significant 
(F(1,82) = 1.63, MSE = .05, η2 = .02, p = .21). 
Incidental Recognition Test 2. We conducted a 2 (Foil Valence: foil words derived from 
the spider recognition subtest, foil words derived from the animal recognition subtest) X 2 
(Spider Fear Groups: high fear of spiders group, low fear of spiders group) repeated measures 
ANOVA for response bias measure C. Results of the analysis revealed a main effect of Foil 
Valence (F(1,82) = 4.65, MSE = .01, η2 = .05, p < .05), whereby response bias was more liberal 
for spider foils (M = .03, SD = .53) than animal foils (M = .06, SD = .50). The ANOVA also 
revealed a main effect of Spider Fear Group (F(1,82) = 4.95, MSE = .49, η2 = .06, p < .05), such 
that the high fear of spiders group had a significantly more conservative response bias than the 
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low fear of spiders group. The Foil Valence X Spider Fear Group interaction was not significant 
(F(1,82) < .01, MSE = .01, η2 < .01, p = .98). Criterion C scores for Test 2 are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Experiment 2 Test 2: Response Bias Measure Criterion C for Participants with High and Low 
Fear of Spiders (standard deviation in parentheses). 
 High Fear of Spiders Group  Low Fear of Spiders Group 
Spider Foils -.19(.41) -.14(.37) 
Animal Foils .08(.48) .11(.43) 
 
3.1.3 Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, we sought to determine whether contexts that are particularly 
threatening would induce a downstream memory bias for foil words tainted by those contexts. 
Previous works suggested that a memory advantage for emotional material would only be 
displayed if the threat was of particular importance to the individual (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 
2009; Ceschi et al., 2003; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky 
et al., 2001). To this end, we instructed participants to study neutral words overlayed onto spider 
images and compared memory performance between individuals who self-reported a high versus 
low fear of spiders. On Test 2, we found a memory advantage for foil words derived from the 
spider Test 1 subtest. However, contrary to our hypothesis, this memory advantage was 
displayed by both the high and the low fear of spiders groups.  
SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) data from our manipulation check indicated that 
participants reported significantly more negative valence and higher physiological arousal 
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following the spider study list compared to both baseline and the neutral animal study list 
condition. Importantly, the high fear of spiders group reported a significantly more negative 
mood following the spider study list in comparison to the low fear of spiders group. There were 
also no between-group differences at either of the other two time points in the study (baseline 
and post-animal study list) indicating that our manipulation had the intended emotional effect. 
However, critically, participants from both groups reported significantly more negative moods 
following the spider list in contrast to  following the animal study list or at baseline. As a result, 
the spider context images may have offered an emotional boost to words studied within this Test 
1 block for both spider fear groups. The memory advantage for the spider-tainted foil words is 
reflected in our Test 2 results whereby all participants, regardless of spider group categorization, 
demonstrated higher recognition accuracy for foils derived from the spider subtest. 
 The results of our study further support a downstream memory advantage for emotionally 
tainted neutral information. Although the memory advantage for Test 1 was absent, which will 
be discussed later, participants still demonstrated a downstream memory bias for threat-tinged 
foil words during Test 2. One possible explanation is the inability to disengage attention from an 
anxiety-inducing cue. Anxious individuals, both clinical and subclinical groups, have been 
shown to have difficulty disengaging from a threatening cue (Fox et al., 2002; 2001; Gerdes, 
Alpers, & Pauli, 2008; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Evidence from eye-tracking 
studies, however, suggests that search for threatening items happens relatively quickly, compared 
to other stimuli (Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe, & Weiss, 2004). Following immediate gazing 
toward the threat, patients typically avoid the fearful cue (Rinck & Becker, 2006). Although eye 
gaze is not directed toward the threat, the inability to disengage attention from the cue suggests 
that threat may still influence various cognitive processes. In turn, the continued attention toward 
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the threat may alter how incidental stimuli in the present environment are perceived. In our study 
then, the incidental foil words in the Test 1 subtests may have been tainted by lingering or 
prolonged thoughts concerning the fearful stimuli. The inability to disengage attention from the 
fearful cue lends an alternate account for the memory advantage for spider foils during Test 2. 
Why then, however, were we unable to find a difference in memory performance on Test 1? 
No Memory Advantage on Test 1 
High spider fear participants did not demonstrate a memory advantage for the spider 
study list during Test 1, contrary to what we anticipated. Previous research demonstrated a 
memory bias only for information that was particularly threatening (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 
2009; Ceschi et al., 2003; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky 
et al., 2001). They did not, however, test whether there was an attentional or memory advantage 
for other information found within the context or made related to the threatening target item. The 
spider images may have proven to be a distraction for participants when going through the study 
list. Drawing from other research, attention and working memory resources are often directed 
toward sources of threat (Bishop et al., 2004, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Stout, Shackman, & 
Larson, 2013) As a result, memory for the target words in Test 1 may not have benefitted from 
the affective mood because attention was directed to the spider images, instead of to the target 
words. In addition, when an anxious cue is present, memory for central features is enhanced, 
while memory for peripheral information decreases (Wessel & Merkelbach, 1998; 1997). Both 
attention and memory processes may have been directed toward the fearful cues instead of the 




Conservative Response Bias for High Fear of Spiders Group 
Previous research had also indicated that participants would demonstrate a more liberal 
response bias for emotional material, as opposed to neutral information (Dougal & Rotello, 
2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). Test 2 results revealed that low fear spider fear participants did 
indeed adopt a more liberal response bias. Interestingly, in contrast with previous work (Becker 
& Rinck, 2004), the high fear of spiders group demonstrated a more conservative response bias. 
Past studies have investigated response bias when directed toward emotional, versus 
unemotional, material. However, all words studied and tested throughout our experiment were 
inherently neutral in valence. Participants may be less prone to report a neutral item as seen 
before, even if the word was encoded within a threatening context. Another possibility is that 
downstream memory response bias may manifest differently than response bias patterns for 
immediate intentional items. We would then only find the liberal response bias in Test 2, and not 
during Test 1. The conservative response bias displayed by the high spider fear group may be a 
result of narrowed focus directed toward the spiders, taking attention away from the foils in the 
spider Test 1 block. In fact, while evidence shows enhanced memory for central, spider stimuli, 
memory for peripheral details suffers (Wessel & Merkelbach, 1998; 1997). Therefore, the 
narrowing of focus toward the spider images themselves may have elicited the conservative 
response bias. 
Our results further contribute to the work regarding the ‘source-constrained retrieval’ 
hypothesis by showing that the memory-for-foils effect can be extended to threat-relevant 
encoding contexts. Participants in both the high and low fear of spiders groups reported a 
significantly more negative mood following presentation of the spider study list. As a 
consequence, foil words that were intermixed among the spider study words received a memory 
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benefit from the emotionally (negative) mode of processing. This benefit was reflected in the 
comparatively high recognition accuracy during Test 2 for the spider-tainted foil words 
compared to the neutral, animal-tainted foil words. Although no memory differences were found 





Chapter 4: General Discussion 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate whether emotional encoding contexts could in 
turn influence how we perceive and remember incidental stimuli present in the environment, 
when we search for those emotionally-tainted targets later on. In a compelling line of work, 
Jacoby and colleagues (2005a; 2005b) introduced the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis, 
suggesting we can constrict our retrieval search patterns for information encoded using a 
particular processing type. As a consequence, incidental information we encounter while 
retrieving target information itself becomes tainted by that mode of processing. To this point, it 
was unclear whether incidental information would be similarly tainted by a re-activated 
emotional mode of processing. As such, in this thesis, we investigated whether the memory 
benefit offered by emotional pictures (Bishop et al., 2004; Bradley et al., 1992; Danion et al., 
1995; Cahill & McGaugh, 1996; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a, 2003b; Phelps & Sharot, 2008) 
would be conferred on incidental foil words. 
In Chapter 2, we investigated this research question by presenting participants with words 
overlayed over an image that was either negative or neutral in valence. Using an adapted 
memory-for-foils paradigm (Jacoby et al., 2005a; 2005b), we found that participants with high 
trait anxiety displayed a memory advantage for incidental information (foils) tainted by a 
negative mode of processing. The results of Experiment 1 extend the findings from previous 
research examing the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis to an emotional mode of 
processing. Importantly, only high anxiety participants demonstrated the downstream memory 
advantage for foils. Low trait anxiety participants did not display any differences in memory 
between the foils encountered among negatively versus neutrally encoded target words; this 
51 
 
result suggests that individual differences in trait anxiety play a role in how information is 
retrieved.  
One notable limitation of our first experiment is that we had no way of verifying whether 
participants had different affective responses to the negative context images. This is problematic 
as affect and arousal levels can influence memory performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), and 
likely the ability to constrain search to a particular emotional mode of processing. To address this 
issue, in Chapter 3, we described an experiment where we instructed spider phobic participants 
to study words overlayed on pictures of spiders. We also conducted a manipulation check to 
verify whether participants responded to the emotional conditions as intended. In this study, we 
found that participants demonstrated a memory advantage for the incidental information (foils) 
tainted with the threat-relevant (spider) mode of processing. However, contrary to expectations, 
the memory advatange was demonstrated by all participants, regardless of self-reported spider 
fear. Importantly, and possibly offering an explanation for the low spider group memory 
advantage, data from our manipulation check indicated that the low spider group reported more 
negative mood ratings following the threatening spider study list. Hence, both groups may have 
been emotionally affected by the threat encoding condition, resulting in the downstream memory 
advantage for foils encountered within the recognition test for targets encoded with spider 
contexts. 
No Memory Advantage on Test 1 
For both studies, we were unable to find the anticipated Test 1 memory advantage for 
negative or threatening information (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 2009; Ceschi et al., 2003; Cloitre 
& Liebowitz, 1991; Cody & Teachman, 2010; Coles et al., 2007; Phelps & Sharot, 2008; 
Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001). A possible explanation is that previous 
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research found a memory advantage specifically for fearful or negative information. The tested 
information in our study was neutral words that were placed within a negative context, as 
opposed to the negative context pictures. When present, anxious or fearful cues have been shown 
to draw attention away from peripheral details (Bishop et al., 2004; Bishop et al., 2007; Cisler & 
Koster, 2010), which make central details more memorable, but at the cost of the peripheral 
information (Wessel & Merkelbach, 1998;1997). As a result, memory for the neutral words did 
not receive a memory benefit from paired negative or threatening images. The question then is 
why did we see a memory advantage for the negatively-tinged and threat-tinged foil words?  
Memory Advantage for Negatively-tainted Foils 
As shown in previous studies, information can become associated with a threat-relevant 
source (Senn & Radomsky, 2012). Research on recapitulation suggests that neural regions, 
including the amygdala and the left inferior frontal gyrus, that were originally active when 
encoding negative information, are reactivated during retrieval (Bowen & Kensinger, 2017; 
Rugg et al., 2008; Vogelsang et al., 2016). As a result, these regions that are known to enhance 
memory performance, such as the amygdala, may also be active when encoding incidental foil 
words during the recognition test (Test 1). Some work even suggests that regions integral to the 
memory process, such as the amygdala and the hippocampus, return to a more active state when 
an individual attempts to recall neutral information that has become associated with a negative 
context, as opposed to a neutral or unemotional context (Dunsmoor, Murty, Davachi, & Phelps, 
2015; Ford, Morris, & Kensinger, 2014; Smith, Henson, Dolan, & Rugg, 2004). Therefore, 
during Test 2, following incidental encoding of the foil words during the recognition test for 
negative targets (Test 1), the now negatively-tinged foils were better remembered than the 
neutrally-tinged foil words.  
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Disengagement of Attention 
The attention literature may offer an alternative account for why we see a memory 
advantage for negatively-tinged foils (Test 2), but not target words that were encoded in negative 
contexts (Test 1). Individuals who encounter anxiety invoking stimuli have been shown to have 
difficulty disengaging from the fearful cue (Fox et al., 2002; 2001; Gerdes et al., 2008; Salemink 
et al., 2007). After being presented with fearful items (negative or spider context pictures), 
attention may have been fixated on those stimuli even after the pictures were no longer 
displayed. Consequently, although the manipulation did not influence memory performance 
during Test 1, the lingering attention on the anxiety provoking visual contexts conferred a benefit 
to  memory later on, during Test 2. 
Motivation may also play a role in the ability to attend to a threatening stimulus. In a recent 
study, Nelson and colleagues (2015) found that motivation was associated with an individual’s 
tendency to direct attention towards, or to avoid, a threatening stimulus. As our study did not 
include a measure of motivation to attend to or avoid the negative context pictures, we cannot 
determine whether motivation was a factor in directing attention amongst our sample group. It is 
important for future research to include a measurement of motivation to distinguish those with a 
tendency to approach threats, from those who tend to avoid them.  Response Bias Patterns  
 Replicating the results of previous work, Test 1 response bias patterns in Experiment 1 
were significantly more liberal during the recognition subtest for target words overlayed onto 
negative contexts (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kapucu et al., 2008). 
However, response bias patterns varied drastically between the two experiments detailed in this 
thesis. During Experiment 1, high trait anxiety participants who had studied words using a 
shallow encoding instruction adopted a more liberal response pattern for foils derived from the 
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negative recognition test block. In contrast, during Experiment 2, high spider fear participants 
displayed a significantly more conservative response bias for the words derived from the spider 
subtest. The answer as to why there was a difference between the studies may lie in the 
specificity of the threat source. As a speculatory explanation, the tendency to treat all sources as 
negative when presented with many sources of threat (Experiment 1) may induce a more liberal 
response bias. In contrast, when focusing on one particular, specific source of threat, such as the 
spiders in Experiment 2, it may be more prudent to constrain one’s search patterns. However, as 
research in downstream response bias is limited, more work must be conducted before final 
conclusions can be made.  
Limitations and other Directions 
 To investigate the influence of anxiety on memory, there are two experimental 
approaches one could take. The first, as in this thesis, is to investigate individual differences in 
the sample group itself. In Chapters 2 and 3, we conducted experiments that considered 
individual differences based on neuropsychological scale measurements. In Experiment 1, our 
anxiety groups were categorized according to a median split based on participants’ scores on the 
DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). However, using a median split to develop our groups may 
not have been ideal as the median can vary based on our sample group. To address this issue, in 
Experiment 2, the high and low spider fear groups were selected from those who scored in the 
top 25% and bottom 25% on the FSQ (Szymanski & O'Donohue, 1995). In this way, we were 
able to collect data from those with an extremely high fear relative to a control group with 
extremely low fear of spiders.  
There is, however, an alternative to the individual differences approach. Specifically, one 
could create an experimental manipulation to induce a state of anxiety. In Experiment 2, both the 
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high and low fear of spiders groups demonstrated a memory advantage for the spider foils. As 
explained previously, the high and low fear of spiders groups reported a more negative mood 
state following presentation of the spiders. Although they had indicated no fear of spiders, they 
still reacted with a more emotional response toward them, relative to baseline and following the 
neutral animal study list. In this case, our threatening condition seems to have been successful in 
inducing an anxious state in both our high and low fear of spiders groups.  
It is worth noting in this thesis that an additional study was previously conducted in 
which we attempted to manipulate emotional state, and then observe the effect that this had on 
memory within the memory for foils paradigm.  In Experiment 3, we used negative or neutral 
film clips to induce anxiety. For the sake of brevity, I present the data from this experiment for 
illustrative purposes, but note that the experiment did not lead to significant effects on memory.  
As shown in Figure 6, we did not see any differences in memory performance on Test 1 or Test 2 
regardless of reported anxiety level. Here the paradigm was identical to that in Experiment 1, 
although there were no negative or neutral context images. Instead, participants either saw the 
negative (2 minute clip of death scene from the movie Lion King) or neutral film clip (2 minute 
documentary of deer in the woods), prior to studying a set of visually-presented words during 
encoding.  The remainder of the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. As can be 
seen from Figure 6, this attempt to induce anxiety failed to have the intended effect on either 
Test 1 or Test 2. However, this general approach of manipulating emotional state rather than 
splitting participants into groups based on individual difference measures is a viable alternative 
approach.  It is possible that a stronger manipulation of emotional state might have been 




Figure 6. Experiment 3: Accuracy Rate on Test 1 (top) and Test 2 (bottom) for high and low 
anxiety groups. 
 Another limitation of Experiment 2 to consider is the use of self-report questionnaires to 
identify our spider fear groups. According to our manipulation check, both the high and low fear 
of spiders groups indicated an increase in arousal following the spider study list. This is of 
particular concern for the low fear of spiders group, since they should have had no emotional 







































to do accurately, particularly when prompted outside the context of the feared situation. In line 
with the discussion on anxiety manipulations, future research could expose participants to the 
fearful stimulus, and use physiological and self-report measures during exposure to identify fear 
groups.  
Individual Differences in Anxiety and Anxiety Manipulations  
 Thus, our findings using anxiety inductions to this point have been rather inconsistent. If 
we consider, though, that the response bias patterns differ between our spider fear groups, the 
picture becomes a bit clearer. It is true that both high and low spider fear groups demonstrated a 
memory advantage for the foils, but the high spider fear group also adopted a considerably more 
conservative response pattern than the low fear group. If the response patterns had remained 
equal, we might have seen the predicted memory performance by spider fear group interaction. 
Thus, it is important to consider both individual differences in trait anxiety as well as anxiety 
manipulations when determining the influence that anxiety has over memory. 
Future Directions 
 It is important for future research to determine the exact process by which tainted 
information is influenced by initial encoding contexts. Previous research on recapitulation 
suggests that when retrieving information encoded using a particular mode of processing (i.e., an 
emotional mode of processing), areas such as the amygdala and the inferior frontal gyrus, 
involved at initial encoding become reactivated (Bowen & Kensinger, 2017; Buckner et al., 
2001; Rugg et al., 2008; Vogelsang et al., 2016). We were unable to find the predicted 
behavioural differences in memory performance during Test 1. It is possible that the neural 
regions involved in emotional processing were not active at the necessary level to produce 
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behavioural effects on memory performance.  Another possibility is that we may only see 
differences in memory performance if the studied and tested items are themselves emotional. In 
this case, participants would study threatening words and not neutral target words overlayed on 
threat-relevant visual contexts, as in this thesis.  
Whether or not the presence of a fearful cue, or a ‘constrained retrieval search’ of items 
tainted by negative emotion, will influence perception of other items present while in that mode 
of processing is an important question to answer. For example, if a spider phobic were to see a 
spider in their kitchen, would other items contained within that room become ‘contaminated’ 
(hold a negative tag) moving forward? As shown by Senn and Radomsky (2012) otherwise 
neutral information, such as a kitchen, can be influenced by a negative cue, such as a spider. 
Consequently, a kitchen could indeed become tainted, hindering the individual’s everyday 
routine.  
In addition, it is also important to pinpoint and understand the role of anxiety on memory. 
Our findings demonstrate that anxiety does play some role in incidental recognition memory. In 
Experiment 1, only the high anxiety group demonstrated the memory advantage for negatively-
tainted foils. While we did not find a between-groups difference in recognition memory 
performance in Experiment 2, the high spider fear group did adopt a far more conservative 
response pattern. Notably, these between anxiety group differences across experiments vary 
quite drastically. It is important for future research in this area to clarify the influence of anxiety 




Emotional events from the past can taint our perception of the present, making current 
circumstances more memorable. When we constrain our memory search to information or events 
encountered within a negative context, or learned using a negative mode of processing, some 
memory benefit held by those thoughts may be conferred on incidental stimuli within our current 
environment. Of note, this downstream memory bias was not displayed by individuals who 
reported low anxiety. Results of Experiment 1 suggest that high trait anxiety may alter how 
threatening information is processed and later remembered. In Experiment 2, all participants 
reported a more negative mood following presentation of the threat-relevant study list, and this 
may account for our finding of a memory advantage for foils encountered while in that threat-
related mode of processing. Results further support the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis 
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Appendix A: Experiment 1 Word Lists 
Negative Study 
Words 
Neutral Study Words Negative Test 1 Foil 
Words 


























































































































































Test 2 Foil Words 
Astronaut Dress Kettle Plane 
Bandage Egg Key Queen 
Basket Engine King Restaurant 
Bathroom Father Lantern Roach 
Board Field Lightning Salad 
Bowl Finger Locker Seat 
Boxer Flower Mail Snake 
Building Garbage Man Sphere 
Cake Garden Metal Street 
Cat Girl Milk Table 
Cellar Gun Mushroom Thief 
Chair Hammer Nun Tool 
City Hand Pamphlet Umbrella 
Coin Highway Pancakes Vehicle 
Cord Horse Pasta Volcano 
Criminal House People Window 
Curtains Hydrant Pig Writer 






Appendix B: Experiment 2 Word Lists 
Spider Study Words Animal Study Words Spider Test 1 Foil 
Words 

























































































































































Test 2 Foil Words 
ace curtains house people 
alien diploma hydrant pig 
alley doctor item pillow 
ankle dress ketchup pizza 
astronaut earth kettle plane 
bathroom engine key queen 
beach errand king razor 
bed father knot restaurant 
board field lightning runner 
boxer flower locker seat 
building foam mail sphere 
cake garbage man tennis 
cellar garden metal thief 
chin girl mushroom tool 
city gun news volcano 
coast hammer nun window 
column hand pamphlet writer 
criminal highway pancakes yacht 
 
